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The considerable renewal of interest in all aspects of financial history over recent
years provided one motivation for this new venture.2 Yet, the foundations for our
specialism, which draws from both History and the Social Sciences, especially
economics, have been laid by many. Some would point to continuity in our interest
from the publication in the 1930s of jubilee banking history volumes, such as those
written for British institutions by Gregory, and by Crick and Wadsworth.3 Further
scholarly momentum came from the studies in comparative banking history under-
taken by researchers inspired and brought together by Rondo Cameron from the
mid-1960s.4 Upon these footings and others,5 financial history has since 'taken off'
to address an increasingly wider range of issues. This considerable broadening of the
specialism, ironically, almost coincided with the decline and then the eventual
demise in 1987 of the Revue Internationale d'Histoire de la Banque, founded in 1968.
This is not the place to draw up a balance sheet of that journal, which has played a
decisive role. Its demise, however, left a gap. Financial History Review aims not only
to take up its cause, but also to widen the scope of publishing in the field - from
1
 We are grateful to Geoffrey Jones for reading and commenting upon an earlier draft of this piece.
2
 One indication of the current position of the subject is the synthesis for Europe by C. P.
Kindleberger, A Financial History of Western Europe (London, 1984), while another, but with the
same geographical limitations, is R. Bogaert, G. Kurgan van Hentenryk and H. van der Wee [sous
la direction de H. van der Wee], La Banque en Occident (Antwerp, 1991).
3
 T. E. Gregory, The Westminster Bank through a Century, 2 vols (London, 1936); W. F. Crick andj. E.
Wadsworth, A Hundred Years of Joint Stock Banking (London, 1936) [a history of the Midland Bank
and its progenitors].
4
 R. Cameron, Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialisation: A Study in Comparative Economic History
(Oxford, 1967); and idem (ed.), Banking and Economic Development: Some Lessons of History (New
York, 1972).
5
 Inspirational studies, which opened up the ground, include: L. S. Pressnell, Country Banking in the
Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 1956); D. S. Landes, Bankers and Pashas: International Finance and
Economic Imperialism in Egypt (London, 1958); J. Bouvier, Le Credit Lyonnais de 1863 a 1882: les annees
deformation d'une banque de depots, 2 vols (Paris, 1961); and M. Levy-Leboyer, Les Banques europeennes
et Vindustrialisation intemationale dans la premiere moitie du XIXe siecle (Paris, 1964).
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FINANCIAL HISTORY REVIEW
banking to financial history — in order to offer the fullest possible support for
continuing research.
One characteristic of the new dynamism within financial history has been the
cementing of closer links between its academic practitioners and the practical world
of banking and finance. The European Association for Banking History provides
some of the most telling evidence. Founded in November 1991 in Frankfurt, largely
as a result of the energies of Professor Dr Manfred Pohl, its objective is to promote
dialogue between European scholars and bankers. The Association's financial sup-
port has been decisive in making this journal possible, for which the editors wish to
express their gratitude.
I
Increasing specialisation within the practice and writing of history, leading possibly
to introversion, has rightly become a growing cause of concern. This fragmentation
is no longer confined to divisions between major areas — political, economic and
social, the history of international relations as well as the history of religions, or of
science and technology. Even these now have their sub-specialities. Economic and
social history, for example, itself straddling the frontier between the humanities and
the social sciences, has not only largely split into two major fields but has also
generated new, almost autonomous studies devoted to a particular aspect, such as
business, labour, transport and the urban realm, each with their own particular
groups of dedicated scholars, increasingly formalised through associations, confer-
ences and journals. Specialisation has its benefits, arising from 'the division of
labour', but none the less may cause myopia and, consequently, if taken to excess is
dangerous. Moreover, it runs the risk of isolating historians from a wider readership,
including policy-makers, at a time when history should play its proper role in
assisting understanding of a very rapidly changing world. Why, then, should a new
journal of financial history be published, which might further increase such separa-
tism? The editors of Financial History Review have carefully considered the problems
involved before they concluded that its launch would have a positive outcome.
Merely regretting the days of the broad syntheses and looking back, with some
wringing of hands, is not a serious alternative. The advance of historical research
has greatly improved the understanding of the past and sustaining its pace calls for a
certain degree of specialisation. There is no easy or obvious compromise, since the
very question of the role of history in society is at stake. Yet, appreciating the
underlying, fundamental difficulties has assisted in establishing some sound guiding
principles to avoid the pitfalls of blind specialisation.
One was to ensure that this journal was concerned with the broadest possible
historical time-span to embrace all of humankind's material experience. Conse-
quently its chronological concern is wide - from the classical to the contemporary
— in order not to lose sight of both long-term continuity and the recurrence of
certain themes, alongside change and structural development which by their very
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nature call for attention. Similarly, its geographical scope is global, with a commit-
ment to publish international and comparative studies as well as those with a
national, regional or local focus. Finally, it is intended that the themes considered
within its covers should not be unduly restrictive. Although the economic aspects
of banking, finance and monetary matters will no doubt form the journal's back-
bone, contributions addressing cultural and social aspects will equally find their
proper place, together with those analysing the interrelations between politics and
finance.
Beyond its committed specialists, financial history is often regarded as the nar-
rowest, most specialised area of history and, above all, a rather arid technical field,
apparently thereby providing one of the best examples of excessive specialisation.
However, the editors are convinced that very much the opposite is the case, and
one of the objects of this editorial, and of this journal, is to provide some demon-
stration. Financial history is an extremely rich and varied vein of History, which,
despite the now clearly marked boundaries within the subject, directly impinges
upon all of its domains. Reflecting upon some facets of recent research, this oppor-
tunity has been taken to outline the great relevance of financial history to business
history, economic history, international history, social history and political history.
II
Financial institutions originated as private undertakings and have largely remained
so in most industrialised countries, the nationalisation of the French commercial
banks and insurance companies in 1945 and 1946 being the most conspicuous
exception. Financial institutions, particularly banks, have also come to feature
amongst the largest companies. Comparisons with industrial undertakings are
fraught with danger, but, to give a few indicative examples, the largest German
concern, measured by paid-up capital, in 1907 was not Krupp but the Deutsche
Bank, while in France it was the Credit Lyonnais. As business enterprises, financial
institutions had partners, then increasingly shareholders, directors and managers. In
their development and evolution senior managements have been continually con-
fronted with strategic choices, arising from growing, or falling, profits or mergers
or failures. There are therefore very valid reasons, arising from size, structure and
purpose, to approach the study of their growth and development within the frame-
work of business history. However, it has equally to be admitted that financial
institutions, particularly banks, have characteristics which may set them apart to
some degree from other business enterprises.
In the first place, the state, perhaps especially in the twentieth century, has given
particular regard to the financial sector. One clear illustration is the attitude of a
government towards a foreign take-over bid for a major commercial bank. Even in
a society as liberal as Britain in such matters, the authorities have generally opposed
the absorption of domestic institutions by foreign concerns. Whereas foreign banks
have been welcome within the United Kingdom, setting up branches from the
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1870s and allowed to compete for domestic business, until very recently they have
not been permitted to acquire a major British commercial bank. This stance of the
state only changed from 1986 when the National Australia Bank took over the
Scottish and Ulster subsidiaries of the troubled Midland Bank and then the
Yorkshire Bank, a provincial clearer. In the most recent case, of the Midland Bank
itself, one of the 'Big Four' clearing banks, the foreign suitor - the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation - was regarded as an acceptable marriage partner
both because of the British influence within its ownership and management since
its foundation in 1865, and the recent shift of its domicile from Hong Kong to the
United Kingdom.
One of the reasons for such sensitivity displayed on the part of the state is the
central role played by large banks within the economy, particularly over the last
century. Whatever the degree of diversification, the wider sphere of influence of
most industrial companies, even many of the multinationals of the last quarter of
the twentieth century, is necessarily more circumscribed than that of a major bank.
Through its innumerable customers coming from all economic sectors and all ranges
of society, a bank thereby acquires particular, close knowledge of the entire indus-
trial and commercial spectrum. Another difference is that, by definition, a bank
works with the financial resources of others. The safety of deposits has come to be
a major concern for the authorities. As a result, they have to resolve the arising
problem of their degree of responsibility for ensuring that, more than in the case of
any other business enterprise, banks may not fail, or at least their depositors have
some security. This in turn has led to concern over the nature and structure of assets
held by banks and other financial institutions. Swedish banks, for example, have
been the subject of such central, state supervision for almost the entire twentieth
century, following the establishment of a Bank Inspectorate in 1907, which com-
piled a register of bank loans from 1917.6
It must also be said that historians themselves have not considered banks to be
like other businesses. Following Alfred Chandler's monumental work,7 the major
debate in business history over the last two or three decades has centred around the
strategy and structure of the large companies. However, until most recently, banks
have been completely excluded from these discussions and the research that has
thereby been generated, in part because Chandler's concern was the modern indus-
trial enterprise, especially in capital-intensive sectors. Instead, generally, banking has
been approached simply as the execution of an economic function — as inter-
6
 See M. Larsson, 'Government subsidy or internal restructing? Swedish commercial banks during the
crisis years of the 1920s', and H. Sjogren, 'Swedish commercial banks: the distribution of their
advances by economic sectors and geographical regions', both in P. L. Cottrell, H. Lindgren and
A. Teichova (eds), European Industry and Banking Between the Wars: A Review of Bank—Industry
Relations (Leicester, 1992).
7
 A. D. Chandler, Jr, Strategy and Structure (Cambridge, Mass., 1962); The Visible Hand: The Managerial
Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977); and Scale and Scope (Cambridge, Mass.,
1990).
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mediation between lenders and borrowers, especially in terms of how efficiently
this has been performed — rather than as a business. Furthermore, this approach of
scholars has not been confined solely to banks, but has applied to the entire finan-
cial sector.8
Nevertheless, over the last 20 years or so the business history of financial insti-
tutions has developed considerably as a genre in its own right. Company histories
are no longer, or rather less often, monographs uncritically written for a 50th or a
I ooth anniversary. Increasingly, banks and other financial companies have com-
missioned professional historians to undertake the task, following the example set
somewhat earlier by industrial concerns. There remain, however, marked differ-
ences between national experiences. Britain undoubtedly led the way: as early as
1936, the Westminster Bank celebrated its first centenary with a two-volume history
penned by the distinguished economist and economic historian T. E. Gregory,9
while the Bank of England commissioned Sir John Clapham for its 250th birthday
in 1944.10 Richard Sayers wrote the history of Lloyds Bank in 1957,11 and P. G. M.
Dickson that of Sun Insurance in i960.12 Thereafter this trend has intensified,
particularly with respect to merchant banks and foreign and colonial banks, with
the histories of Morgan Grenfell, Schroders,13 the massive four-volume history of
the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank,14 and the two-volume history of the British
8
 However, this is not to deny that such an approach, applying the work of, for instance, J. G. Gurley
and E. S. Shaw (Money in a Theory of Finance, Washington, DC, i960), led to a greater understand-
ing, as exemplified by that of Cameron and his associates. For a recent review of their contribution,
see S. Pollard and D. Ziegler, 'Banking and industrialization: Rondo Cameron twenty years on', in
Y. Cassis (ed.), Finance and Financiers in European History, i88o-ig6o (Cambridge/Paris, 1992).
A recent change in the interest of business historians is indicated by a recent number of Business
History, 33.3 (July 1991), edited by G. Jones, which was a special issue on Banks and Money:
International and Comparative Finance in History.
9
 Gregory, Westminster Bank.
10
 Sir J. H. Clapham, The Bank of England: A History, 2 vols (Cambridge, 1944). This was followed by
Sayers' equally fine continuation, The Bank of England 1891—1944, 3 vols (Cambridge, 1976). The
Bank has turned to 'insiders' for its most recent considerations of its continuing development; see
most particularly J. Fforde, The Bank of England and Public Policy, 1941—1958 (Cambridge, 1992), but
also E. Hennessy, A Domestic History of the Bank of England 1930—1960 (Cambridge, 1992). This has
been complemented, but for the nineteenth century, by the recently published doctoral work of
D. Ziegler: Das Korsett der Alten Dame'. Die Geschdftspolitik der Bank of England 1844-1913,
Schriftenreihe des Institituts fur bankhistorische Forschung e. V, 15 (Frankfurt-a.-M., 1990); and,
translated by E. Martin, Central Bank, Peripheral Industry: The Bank of England in the Provinces
1826-1913 (Leicester/London, 1990).
II
 R. S. Sayers, Lloyds Bank in the History of English Banking (Oxford, 1957).
12
 P. G. M. Dickson, The Sun Insurance Office, 1710-1960 (London, i960).
13
 K. Burk, Morgan Grenfell 1838-1988: The Biography of a Merchant Bank (Oxford, 1989); R. Roberts,
Schroders: Merchants & Bankers (1992).
14
 F. H. H. King, The History of The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, vol. I: The Hongkong
Bank in Late Imperial China 1864—1902: On an Even Keel (Cambridge, 1987); vol. II: The Hongkong
Bank in the Period of Imperialism and War, 1895—1918: Wayfoong, the Focus of Wealth (Cambridge,
1988); vol. Ill: The Hongkong Bank between the Wars and the Bank Interned, 1919—1945: Return from
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Bank of the Middle East.15 Companies engaged elsewhere in the financial sector
have also now followed this path, insurance being represented by the histories of
the Royal Exchange, Phoenix and the Provincial;16 the Stock Exchange with the
histories of firms such as Foster & Braithwaite and Cazenove;17 and the financial
press with the centenary history of the Financial Times,18 an essential part of the
financial scene in twentieth-century Britain.
The development of banking in the countries that once constituted the British
dominions and colonies has also been reviewed through the production of pro-
fessionally researched monographs, together with openly declared celebratory
pieces. Many of these built upon the surveys of Baster, published from 1929,19 and
syntheses are still a characteristic, particularly of Canadian work.20 In some contrast,
there has been a flow of books concerned with the growth and development of
particular banks, and other financial institutions, in Australia and New Zealand.21
The writing of the histories of British banks in Africa has run directly in parallel
with that of the domestic 'clearers'.22 A rather different perspective is provided by
Grandeur (Cambridge, 1988); and vol. IV: The Hongkong Bank in the Period of Development and
Nationalism, 1941—1984: From Regional Bank to Multinational Group (Cambridge, 1991).
15
 G. Jones, The History of the British Bank of the Middle East, vol. I: Banking and Empire in Iran
(Cambridge, 1986); and vol. II: Banking and Oil (Cambridge, 1987).
16
 B. Supple, The Royal Exchange Assurance: A History of British Insurance 1720-1970 (Cambridge, 1970);
C. Trebilcock, Phoenix Assurance and the Development of British Insurance, vol. I: 1782—1870
(Cambridge, 1987); O. Westall, The Provincial Insurance Company 1903—1938: Family, Market and
Competitors (Manchester, 1993).
17
 W. J. Reader, A House in the City: A Study of the City and the Stock Exchange based on the records of
Foster & Braithwaite 1823-1975 (London, 1979); D. Kynaston, Cazenove & Co: A History (London,
1991).
18
 D . Kynaston, The Financial Times (London, 1988).
19
 A. J. Baster, The Imperial Banks (London, 1929); idem, The International Banks (London, 1935).
20
 R . Rud in , Banking en francais: The French Banks of Quebec, 1835-1925 (Toronto, 1985); A. B.
McCullough, Money and Exchange in Canada to 1900 (Toronto, 1984); but see also D . Merrill,
Canada's First Bank: A History of the Bank of Montreal, 2 vols (Toronto, 1966).
21
 S. J. Butlin, Australia and New Zealand Bank, The Bank of Australasia, and the Union Bank of Australia,
1828—1951 (London, 1961); J. D . Bailey, A Hundred Years of Pastoral Banking (Oxford, 1966);
R . Gollan, The Commonwealth Bank of Australia: Origins and Early History (Canberra, 1968);
R . J. Holder, Bank of New South Wales, 2 vols (Sydney, 1970); G. R . Hawke, Between Governments
and Banks: A History of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Wellington, 1973); M. French, A Century
of Homemaking: A History of the Toowoomba Permanent Building Society, 1875—1975 (Toowoomba,
1979); G. Blainey and G. Hut ton , Gold and Paper: A History of the National Bank of Australasia
Limited (South Melbourne, 1983); and D. Merrett, ANZ Bank (Sydney, 1985).
2 2
 A Banking Centenary: Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas), 1836—1936 (London , 1936) —
al though p reda t ed by G. T . A m p h l e t t , History of the Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd, 1862-1913
(Glasgow, 1914); idem, A Bank in Battledress (London, 1948); and Sir J. Crossley and j . Blandford,
The DCO Story (London, 1975); while reference should also be made to Standard Bank, 1892—1967:
Three Quarters of a Century of Banking in Rhodesia (Salisbury, 1967) and J. A. Henry, The First Hundred
Years of the Standard Bank (London, 1963).
On other British 'imperial' banks in Africa, see G. Tyson, 100 Years of Banking in Asia and Africa
(London, 1963); and R. Fry, Bankers in West Africa (London, 1976).
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Bagchi, who has commenced the task of writing a history of the State Bank of
India, beginning with its British colonial progenitors, of which the first two volumes
have appeared.23
Company monographs of a high academic standard are still relatively rare in
continental Europe, although the analysis of the early years of the Credit Lyonnais
by Jean Bouvier, published in 1961, remains one of the best of its kind. Bertrand
Gille's study of the experience of the French Rothschilds up to 1870 is still unsur-
passed and Alain Plessis's three-volume history of the Banque de France under the
Second Empire also provides a model for emulation.24 Yet it is only recently that
European banks have started to turn to professional historians, most particularly the
French 'banques d'affaires' — the Banque de l'lndochine, now part of Indosuez, and
the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas.25 German institutions, for a long time as
secretive as the Swiss,26 have followed suit, with a scholarly history of the private
bank Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie.27 and the forthcoming collective history of the
Deutsche Bank, commissioned for the 125th birthday of the bank. Major banks in
Italy and Spain have also asked suitably qualified professionals to analyse their past.28
Smaller European countries, such as Austria, Belgium or Sweden, have been more
advanced, as exemplified by the histories of the Credit-Anstalt, the Kredietbank
and the Stockholms Enskilda Bank.29 Other financial activities, however, have
hardly been touched upon.
23
 A . K. Bagch i , The Evolution of the State Bank of India: The Roots, 1806-1876: pt I: The Early Years,
1806-1860; p t II: Diversity and Regrouping, 1860-1876 ( B o m b a y , 1987).
24
 J . B o u v i e r , Le Credit Lyonnais de 1863 a 1882; B . Gi l le , Histoire de la Maison Rothschild, 2 vols ( G e n e v a ,
1965, 1967); A . Plessis, La Banque de France et ses deux cents actionnaires sous le Second Empire ( G e n e v a ,
1982); Regents et Gouvemeurs de la Banque de France sous le Second Empire ( G e n e v a , 1985); a n d La
Politique de la Banque de France sous le Second Empire ( G e n e v a , 1985).
25
 M . M e u l e a u , Des pionniers en Extreme-Orient: la Banque de l'lndochine, 1875-1985 (Paris, 1989) [ T h e
path-breaking study of the Banque de l'lndochine by the Japanese scholar, Gonjo, has recently
been published as a translation into French]; E. Bussiere, Paribas. L'Europe et le monde (Antwerp,
1992).
26
 A n early e x c e p t i o n , b u t o f t h e j u b i l e e k i n d , is W . A. J o h r , Schweizerische Kreditanstalt, 1856-1956
(Zur i ch , 1956), a n d t h e r e is also H . B a u e r , Societe de banque Suisse 1872-1972 (Basel, 1972).
27
 M . S t u r m e r , G . T e i c h m a n a n d W . T r e u e , Wa'gen und Wagen. Sal. Oppenheim jr. et Cie. Geschichte
einer Bank und einer Familie ( M u n i c h / Z u r i c h , 1989). A vers ion in Engl ish is current ly b e i n g
prepared .
28
 J. L. Garcia and G. Tortella have been commissioned to write a history of the Banco Hispano-
Americano and the Banco Central, which merged in 1992 to form the Banco Central Hispano. A
professionally written history will be part of the forthcoming jubilee of the Banca Commerciale
Italiana.
29
 E . M a r z , Oesterreichische Industrie- und Bankpolitik in der Zeit Franz Josephs I. Am Beispiel der k.k. priv.
Oesterreichischen Credit-Anstalt fiir Handel und Gewerbe (Vienna , 1968); i d e m , Oesterreichische
Bankpolitik in der Zeit der grossen Wende 1913—1923 (Vienna , 1981), t rans . C . Kessler as Austrian
Banking and Financial Policy. Creditanstalt at a Turning Point, 1913—1923 ( L o n d o n , 1984). H . v a n d e r
W e e a n d M . Verbey t , Mensen maken Geschiedenis. De Kredietbank en de Economische Opgang van
Vlaanderen 1935—1985 (Brussels, 1985), w i t h an abr idged , F r e n c h ve r s ion : Les Hommesfont 1'histoire:
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There is a rich American literature on the development of banks, underpinned
by a substantial number of doctoral theses, yet until the 1970s, as Cameron has
commented, 'much of the emphasis [was] on the political rather than the economic
aspects.' The decentralised 'unit' structure of the system has also had its effects.
Syntheses are now coming forward, as with James's treatment of the correspondent
banking network during the last quarter of the nineteenth century and Lamoreaux's
study of banking in New England. Alongside these have appeared since the
mid-1980s studies of both the private banks who maintained their dominant pos-
ition through to the twentieth century, as with Morgans, and joint stock banks,
some of whose origins date from the closing decades of the eighteenth century.30
It has become fashionable to criticise company monographs, however seriously
written, for being too limited in their focus, overblown with details and with very
little in the way of generalisation. This is only partly valid, as only the framework
and apparatus of a monograph offers the possibility of an in-depth analysis of all
aspects of a company's development. The criticism would be more telling if banking
history, conceived as business history, was confined to company monographs. This
is not the case. Although there has been no major attempt at theorising the develop-
ment, as opposed to the function, of financial institutions, certain types of financial
activity have been approached through the collective experience of a number of
institutions, for example multinational banks and merchant banks in Britain.31
Ill
Financial history is intimately connected with the theme which has dominated
economic history since the earliest days of the emergence of the discipline: econ-
omic growth and industrial development. The contribution of banking has fasci-
nated generations of historians, economists and theorists. Hilferding's theory of
La Kredietbank et I'essor economique de la Flandre 1935—1985. O. Gasslander, Bank och industrellt
genombrott, Stockholms Enskilda Bank kring sekelskiftet 1900, 2 vols (Stockholm, 1956, i960), translated
as History of Stockholms Enskilda Bank to 1914; U. Olsson, Bank, familj och foretagande. Stocksholms
Enskilda Bank 1946—1971 (Stockholm, 1986); H. Lindgren, Investmentbolag och bankfirma, Stockholms
Eskilda bank 1924—45 (Stockholm, 1987); and R. Lundstrom, Bank och utlandsaffdrer (Stockholm,
1990): see also E. Soderlund, Skandinaviska Banken. I det Svenska Bankvasendets Historia, 1864-1914
(S tockho lm, 1964); G . T h u n b e r g , Uplandsbanken 1865—1965 (Uppsala, 1965); K . - G . Hi ldebrand , I
omvandligens tjdnst. Svenska Handelsbanken 1871-1971 (S tockho lm, 1971); E. Soder lund,
Skandinaviska Banken i det svenska banwdsendets historia 1914—39 (Uppsala, 1978); and K. Ul lenhag ,
Vaganmotfusionene. Uplandsbanken 1965—85 (Uppsala, 1990).
3 0
 J . A . J a m e s , Money and Capital Markets in Postbellum America (Pr ince ton , NJ , 1978); N . Lamoreaux ,
Insider Lending: Banks, Personal Connections and Economic Development in Industrial New England
1789—1912 (Cambridge, 1994); and see also R. Sylla, 'The United States, 1863—1913', in Cameron
(ed.), Banking and Economic Development; V. P. Carosso, The Morgans: Private International Bankers,
1854-1913 (Cambridge, Mass., 1987); H. Van B. Cleveland and T. F. Huertas, Citibank 1812-1970
(Cambridge, Mass., 1985); J. D. Wilson, The Chase (Boston, Mass., 1986).
31
 G.Jones (ed.), Banks as Multinationals (London, 1990); idem, British Multinational Banking 1830-1990
(Oxford, 1993); S. D. Chapman, The Rise of Merchant Banking (London, 1984).
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finance capital32 or Gerschenkron's approach in terms of economic backwardness,33
for example, have inspired innumerable studies of both an empirical and a speculat-
ive character. Some, most notably those of Rondo Cameron and his associates,
have in turn re-opened debate and generated new rounds of research.34
The relationship between finance and industry has continued to attract much
attention from historians, as witnessed by the considerable number of conferences
recently held on the subject. This is certainly due not only to the continuing
importance of that relationship, but also because some of the issues have remained
open-ended controversies, for example the respective merits of deposit banking and
universal banking, or the financing of small and medium-sized companies. These
discussions, like all debates over historical issues, have been affected by differences
and changes in theoretical and methodological approaches, as well as by diverging
ideological and political standpoints. But the field has also been left open to more
general discussion because of a still far from complete knowledge of the subject, in
particular for the crucial period from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth
century, and until very recently the often forced reliance on secondary material,
such as textbooks, treatises and other contemporaneous analyses. However, change
is in the air. In most European countries, thoroughly grounded empirical research,
arising from greater accessibility of the archives of banking35 or industrial compan-
32
 R . Hi l fe rd ing , Das Finanzkapital (V ienna , 1910), t ransla ted as Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest
Phase of Capitalist Development ( L o n d o n , 1981). F o r a c r i t ique , see H . A . W i n k l e r (ed.) , Organisierter
Kapitalismus. VoraufSetzungen und Anfange ( G o t t i n g e n , 1974); a n d V . W e l l h o n e r , Grofibanken und
GrofSindustrie im Kaiserreich ( G o t t i n g e n , 1989).
33
 A. Gerschenkron, 'Economic backwardness in historical perspective', in B. Hoselitz (ed.), The
Progress of Underdeveloped Areas (Chicago, 1952), reprinted in Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness
in Historical Perspective (New York, 1965).
For aspects of the critique, see S. L. Barsby, 'Economic backwardness and the characteristics of
development', Journal of Economic History, 29 (1969); Cameron, Banking and Economic Development;
D. Good, 'Backwardness and the role of banking in nineteenth century European industrialization',
Journal of Economic History, 33 (1973); R. Sylla, 'Financial intermediaries in economic history:
quantitative research on the seminal hypotheses of Lance Davis and Alexander Gerschenkron', in
R. E. Gallman (ed.), Recent Developments in the Study of Business and Economic History (Greenwich,
Conn., 1977); R. Tilly, 'Banking institutions in historical and comparative perspective: Germany,
Great Britain and the United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth century', Journal of
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 145 (1989); R. Sylla and G. Toniolo (eds), Patterns of European
Industrialization (1991); and H. Lindgren, 'Introduction: the research agenda and its intellectual
setting', and A. Teichova, 'Rivals and partners: reflections on banking and industry in Europe
1880—1938', both in Cottrell et al. (eds.), European Industry and Banking.
34
 Cameron's Report to the V International Congress of Economic History, 'Banking and credit as
factors in economic growth' (Leningrad, August 1970), indicated that it was the first such meeting
of the profession to have a session devoted specifically to banking and credit, but pointed to
antecedents from the first (Stockholm) congress, then running on through the Aix-en-Provence
(where Cameron contributed 'Theoretical bases of a comparative study of the role of financial
institutions in the early stages of industrialisation'), Munich and Bloomington meetings.
35
 Fo r o n e genera l e x a m p l e , see L. S. Pressnel l a n d J. O r b e l l , A Guide to the Historical Records of British
Banking, Business Archives Council (Aldershot, 1985). For its part, the Banca Commerciale Italiana
has begun to publish a series of guides to its archives, as with Collana Inventari, Serie I, I, Presidenza
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ies, has reopened the question of the actual behaviour of banks towards industry
and the degree of dependence of industrial companies on external funds, whether
obtained from the banks or from the capital markets. Three main trends can be
detected.
Firstly, banks have on the whole been absolved from the sin of 'failing' industry.
This is particularly true of the two countries where such accusations had been most
persistent: France and Britain.36 In both countries external finance, whether pro-
vided by the banks or more generally by the public markets, appears to have been
adequate to complement what was, as everywhere else, the major source of funds
for industrial firms: self-finance. On the other hand, recent research on the finance
of the major German industrial concerns has considerably played down the role of
banks.37 This has led to a partial revision of the traditional wisdom in the literature
contrasting starkly the British model, epitomising deposit banking, and the German
model, epitomising universal banking. Secondly, the roles played by such insti-
tutions as local and regional banks, savings banks and popular banks are being
re-evaluated.38 They now appear to have been decisive in the crucial question of
the financing of small and medium-sized companies, undertakings whose relation-
ships with the large banks have always been contentious. Large banks, in all
countries, have tended to favour large industrial concerns to the neglect of lesser
companies. The persistence of a decentralised banking system may have been an
E Consiglio Di Atnministrazione (1894—1934) (Milan, 1990); Serie VI, III, Societa Finanziaria Industriale
Italiana (Sofindit) (Milan, 1991). Each annual vo lume of Financial History Review will contain an
article discussing banking and financial archives.
36
 A. Plessis, 'Les banques, le credit et l ' economie ' , in M . Levy-Leboyer and J . -Cl . Casanova (eds),
Entre I'etat et le marche: l'economie francaise de 1880 a nos jours (Paris, 1991), and the special issue of
Entreprises et Histoire, 1.2 (1992) edited by Alain Plessis. For a survey of the current position of
research o n the U K see M . Collins, British Banks and Industrial Finance before 1939 (London, 1990).
37
 O n the debate wi th respect to the part of the banks, see H . Neuberge r and H . H . Stokes, 'German
banks and German growth: an empirical v iew' , Journal of Economic History, 34 (1974); R . Fremdling
and R . Tilly, ' G e r m a n banks, Ge rman g rowth and econometr ic history' , Journal of Economic History,
36 (1976); H . M . N e u b u r g e r and H . H . Stokes, 'Ge rman banks and German growth: Rep ly ' ,
Journal of Economic History, 36 (1976); J. Komlos , ' T h e Kreditbanken and German growth: a post-
script', Journal of Economic History, 38 (1978); R . Tilly, 'Mergers, external growth, and finance in the
deve lopment of large-scale enterprise in Germany, 1880—1913', Journal of Economic History, 42
(1982); idem, 'Ge rman banking, 1850—1914: development assistance for the strong' , Journal of
European Economic History, 15 (1986). Nearly all these contr ibut ions to the basic literature have
recently been reprinted in R . C a m e r o n (ed.), Financing Industrialization, 2 vols (Aldershot, 1992),
w h i c h also contains relevant 'revisionist' material for o ther countries.
38
 M. Levy-Leboyer and M. Lescure, 'France', in R. Sylla and G. Toniolo (eds), Patterns of European
Industrialization; M. Lescure, 'Les banques et le financement des PME dans la France des annees
1920', Entreprises et Histoire, I (1992); D. Ziegler, 'The origins of the "Macmillan Gap": Britain and
Germany in the twentieth century', paper presented to the International Workshop on Banks and
Customers, London School of Economics (September, 1991); and P. Thomes, 'German savings
banks as instruments of regional development up to World War Two', paper presented to
International Conference on Financial Institutions and Financial Markets in Twentieth Century
Europe and North America, Zurich (May, 1993).
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advantage in that respect. Thirdly, a new theoretical framework, inspired by the
theories of asymmetrical information and portfolio management, has become
increasingly used by historians as a tool of analysis.39 Banks are increasingly
now viewed as playing a major part in the production and distribution of
information concerned with the risks and returns of financial investments, while
their role, and that more generally of financial intermediaries, primarily consists in
correcting the asymmetry of information at the disposal of the borrower and the
lender.
The too often neglected question of financial innovation is best seen in this
context. Economic growth cannot be explained without taking account of the
continuous discovery of new financial instruments which have facilitated inter-
national trade and industrial growth, from the first use of bills of exchange for
international transactions by Italian bankers in the early modern period40 to the
revolution in the gathering and diffusion of information in the 1970s and 1980s,
leading to the coining of the term 'information technology'; or through the begin-
nings of deposit banking in eighteenth-century Scotland;41 or again, through the
conception of investment banking, from Jacques Lafitte to the Pereire brothers,42
in nineteenth-century France. These and many other innovations have made the
fortunes of, or sometimes ruined, their initiators.43 Contrary to a technical inven-
tion with an industrial application, they are not protected by patents and spread
39
 Some of the theoretical literature which is now shaping the approach of financial historians includes:
T. Campbell and W. Kracaw, 'Information production, market signalling and the theory of
financial intermediation', Journal of Finance, 4 (1980); J. Fried and P. Howitt, 'Credit rationing and
implicit contract theory', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 12 (1980); J. E. Stiglitz and A. Weiss,
'Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information', American Economic Review, 71 (1981);
H. Bester, 'Screening versus rationing in credit markets with imperfect information', American
Economic Review, 73 (1985); O. E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York,
1985); H. R. Varian, 'Differences of opinion in financial markets', in C. C. Stone (ed.), Financial
Risk: Theory, Evidence and Implications (Bos ton , Mass . , 1987).
40
 R. de Roover, L'Evolution de la lettre de change XlVe—XVIIIe siecle (Paris, 1953); and, on the
contribution of Dutch bankers, H. van der Wee, 'Anvers et les innovations de la technique
financieres aux XVIe et XVIIe siecles', Annales ESC, 22 (1967).
41
 S. G. Checkland, Scottish Banking History, 1695-^73 (Glasgow, 1975); C. W. Munn, The Scottish
Provincial Banking Companies 1747—1864 (Ed inburgh , 1981); i dem, ' T h e c o m i n g o f j o i n t - s t o c k
bank ing in Scot land and Ireland, c. 1820—1848', in T . D e v i n e and D . D i c k s o n (eds) Ireland and
Scotland 1600-1850 (Ed inburgh , 1983).
4 2
 F. R e d l i c h , 'Jacques Lafitte and t h e beg inn ings of i nves tmen t b a n k i n g in France ' , Bulletin of the
Business Historical Society, 22 (1948); D . S. Landes, 'Vieille B a n q u e et B a n q u e N o u v e l l e : la r evo lu t ion
financiere du d i x - n e u v i e m e siecle' , Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, 3 (1956), translated as
'The Old Bank and the New: the financial revolution of the nineteenth century', in F. Crouzet,
W. H. Chaloner and W. M. Stern (eds), Essays in European Economic History (1969); R. E. Cameron,
France and the Economic Development of Europe (Princeton, NJ, 1961); B. M. Ratcliffe, 'Some banking
ideas in France in the 1830s. The writings of Emile and Isaac Pereire 1830-35', Revue Internationale
d'Histoire de la Banque, 10 (1975); a n d j . A u t i n , Les Freres Pereire: le bonheur d'entreprendre (Paris, 1984).
43
 F. Redlich, 'Two nineteenth century financiers and autobiographers. A comparative study in
creative destructiveness and business failure', Economy and History, 10 (1967).
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very rapidly. This has greatly magnified their rapid impact and this whole area
requires further analysis.
The second facet of the interconnection between financial history and economic
history is the contribution of monetary factors to economic growth. Over the past
three decades monetary history has been one of the fastest growing fields, with
research spurred particularly by the publication of Friedman and Schwartz's seminal
volume.44 The inflationary experience of the closing decades of the present century
led by its very experience to a further theoretical review of the role of money, with
the conclusion that money did matter. The buttressing of that conclusion called for
long-term historical investigation of the relationships between money and the real
economy, with Friedman's work providing a model for others. To take Britain as
simply one example, it has resulted in endeavours of varying kinds — debating
pamphlets, the compilation of existing statistical sources and the construction of
new monetary series — by Walters, Shepherd and, most recently, by Capie and
Webber.45 Although the full digestion of the implications of these studies and
others46 is still incomplete, their ramifications are substantial and have created
further controversy. Friedman's view of the responsibility of the 'Fed' for the onset
of the 'Great Slump' has, for example, led to further rounds of research and yet
more 'revisionism', of which the most recent is Wheelock's monograph.47
Late twentieth-century inflation not only caused a necessary bout of theoretical
introspection and re-examination, which brought together economics, statistics and
history — the Schumpeterian triumvirate — and added econometrics, but has given
rise to other, broader studies, of which some are in a more traditional vein. This has
been nowhere more the case than with respect to the German 'great inflation' of
the early 1920s, with all its implications for society and politics, as well as the course
of the real economy, let alone Europe and the world.48
44
 M . Fr i edman and A. J . Schwar tz , A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Pr inceton, NJ,
1963). Th i s is n o t to ove r look the real indicator , hera ld ing a change in att i tudes and approaches —
M . Fr i edman (ed.), Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money (Chicago , III. , 1956).
45
 A. A. Walters , Money in Boom and Slump, H o b a r t Paper 44 (1969); D . K. Sheppard, The Growth and
Role of UK Financial Institutions 1880-1962 (1971); F. C a p i e and A. W e b b e r , A Monetary History of
the United Kingdom, vol . I, Data, Sources, Methods (1985); an analytical s tudy is promised .
46
 C o m p a r a b l e w o r k o n F rench m o n e t a r y history includes M . Sa in t -Marc , Histoire monetaire de la
France 1800-1980 (Paris, 1983); and J. P. Patat and M. Lutfala, Histoire monetaire de la France au XXe
siecle (Paris, 1986).
47
 D. C. Wheelock, The Strategy and Consistency of Federal Reserve Monetary Policy, 1924-1933
(Cambr idge , 1991).
48
 For example, O. Bosch and G. D. Feldman (eds), Historische Prozesse der deutschen Inflation. Ein
Tagungsbericht (Berlin, 1978); G. D. Feldman et al. (eds), Die deutsche Inflation. Bine Zwischenbilanz
(Berlin, 1982); G. D. Feldman, C.-L. Holtfrereich, G. A. Ritter and P. C. Witt (eds), The Experience
of Inflation: International and Comparative Studies (Berlin, 1984); C.-L. Holtferich, translated by
T. Balderston, The German Inflation, 1914—1923: Causes and Effects in International Perspective (Berlin,
1986); M. L. Hughes, Paying for the German Inflation (Chapel Hill, NC, 1988); A. W. Kunz, Civil
Servants and the Politics of Inflation and Stabilization in Germany 1914-1924 (Berkeley, Cal., 1983);
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IV
International finance is undoubtedly one of the most fascinating themes in history.
Dynasties of international private bankers, such as the Rothschilds49 in the nine-
teenth century or the Morgans in the twentieth century, captured the contemporary
popular imagination because of their legendary wealth, their real and mythical
power, both apparently deriving from their involvement in large-scale international
financial operations, particularly in wartime or periods of heightened diplomatic
tension. They epitomise the multifaceted relationships between finance and
diplomacy.
The export of capital is at the core of all questions related to the history of
international finance. It is a huge question which ranges from technical matters to
high politics. On the technical side, on which all general interpretations ultimately
depend, the amount, direction and forms of foreign investments have remained an
important area of investigation. All evaluations of the amount of capital exported,
whether before 1914 or since, remain highly uncertain and are therefore regularly
re-estimated.50 The most recently established new consensus, however, concerns
the forms of capital exports: direct investment and portfolio investment.51 It now
clearly appears that the former had been vastly underestimated, especially in the case
of the experience of the largest capital exporter before 1914: Britain. This has had
far-reaching implications, not only in an evaluation of the role of multinational
companies, but also in the more general question of the effects of capital exports.52
Capital exports have, from their very beginning, been linked with the question
R. G. Moeller, German Peasants and Agrarian Politics 1914—1924: The Rhineland and Westphalia
(Chapel Hill, NC, 1986).
49
 The extent of the continuing fascination is indicated by David Landes' comment that 'A library has
been written on this family': in terms of just the scholarly examination of the Rothschilds' rise to
prominence the best, along with Gille's work, are C. W. Berghoffer, Meyer Amschel Rothschild, der
Griinder des Rothschildschen Bankhauses (Frankfurt, 1923); R. Ehrenberg, Grosse Vermogen, vol. I, Die
Fugger-Rothschild-Krupp (Jena, 1925); E. Corti, The Rise of the House of Rothschild (New York, 1928);
J. Bouvie r , Les Rothschilds (Paris, 1967); S. D . C h a p m a n , ' T h e founda t ion o f t h e Engl ish
Rothsch i lds ' , Textile History, 8 (1977); and i d e m , N. M. Rothschild, 1777-1836 (pr ivately pr in ted ,
1977)-
50
 For example, D. C. M. Platt, Britain's Investment Overseas on the Eve of the First World War: The Use
and Abuse of Numbers (1986), but also C. Feinstein, 'Britain's overseas investments in 1913', Economic
History Review, 2nd ser., 43 (1990). For France, see M. Levy-Leboyer, 'La Balance des paiements et
Fexportation des capitaux francais', in M. Levy-Leboyer (ed.), La Position Internationale de la France:
aspects economiques et financiers (Paris, 1977).
51
 The 'touchstone' was P. Svedberg, 'The portfolio-direct composition of private foreign investment
in 1914 revisited', Economic Journal, 88 (1978), with one example of the 'revisionist' consequences
being I. Stone, 'British direct and portfolio investment in Latin America before 1914', Journal of
Economic History, 27 (1977). A yet further reinterpretation arises from M. Wilkins, 'The free-
standing company, 1870—1914: an important type of British foreign direct investment', Economic
History Review, 2nd ser., 41 (1988).
52
 R . C a m e r o n and V. I. B o v y k i n (eds), International Banking 1870—1914 ( N e w York , 1991).
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of imperialism. For generations the main issue has revolved around the determi-
nation of the primary explanatory factor: economic or political? This continues to
lurk in the background behind all discussions of imperialism, even though research
has now shown that the global regions receiving foreign investment did not neces-
sarily coincide with the exporting economies' political colonies. Nevertheless,
Jacques Marseille has recently proposed a new chronology for the relationships
between France and its empire by emphasising the relative importance of the
empire as an area of French capital exports.53 Cain and Hopkins, for their part, in
their recently published two volumes see the dominant position of finance, and
more generally of the service industries, in British economy and society as the main
force behind British imperialism.54
The causes and consequences of capital exports, both for the exporting and
importing countries, remain one of the central themes in international financial
history. Here again, some of the old polemics have been replaced by a more
consensual view. On the whole, capital exports are not considered to have greatly
harmed the domestic economies of either the major exporting countries — Britain55
and France — or the smaller European countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands
and Switzerland, before 1914. The effects on the importing countries are too diverse
to be simply judged in terms of positive or negative. It can still be strongly argued
that in some cases it ended in a loss of sovereignty — Egypt, Tunisia and, to a certain
extent, the Ottoman Empire being the most obvious examples. However, foreign
investments were not necessarily translated into 'economic' or 'business' imperi-
alism.56 Although a generation ago multinational enterprises were often regarded as
the very symbol of economic imperialism, in recent years both developed and
developing countries have been competing to attract such foreign investments.
International finance is also affected by the prevailing international monetary
conditions. The apparently smooth operation of the pre-1914 gold standard has
fascinated many and has come to appear as an ideal for many subsequent policy-
makers. Its almost frictionless operation has been attributed to a particular combi-
nation of circumstances, among them being Britain's dominant position in the
world economy and the role of the City and the pound sterling in international
settlements.57 However, the apparent automatic nature of its mechanisms offers
little scope for the analysis of the actions of the governments or the central banks,
although not all of the latter played by the 'rules of the game'. The international
conferences which repeatedly during the last quarter of the nineteenth century
5 3
 J . Marseil le, Empire colonial et capitalismefranfais. Histoire d'un divorce (Paris, 1984).
5 4
 P . J . Ca in and A. G. H o p k i n s , British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914, and British
Imperialism: Crisis and Reconstruction 1914—1990 (1993).
5 5
 S. Pollard, 'Capi ta l expor ts , 1870—1914': harmful o r beneficial? ' , Economic History Review, 2 n d ser.,
38 (1985).
5 6
 D . C . M . Platt (ed.), Business Imperialism 1840-lgjo (Oxford , 1977).
5 7
 S. N . Broadbe r ry and N . F. R . Crafts (eds), Britain in the International Economy 1870-1939
(Cambridge, 1992).
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debated the relative merits of introducing a global bimetallic standard never seemed
likely in practice to reverse the growing ascendancy of gold, and consequently have
been either ignored or treated as historical curiosities. In contrast, politics, econ-
omics and monetary conditions were never more closely interwoven than in the
interwar years. The failings in cooperation between central bankers, the doubts
existing about the merits of the Gold Exchange Standard, the disrespect for the
'rules of the game', the 'politicization' of monetary issues; all these factors had a
direct effect not only on monetary conditions but also on the economic depression,
and ultimately on political instability.58
V
At first sight financial history might appear as the antithesis of social history. Yet this
overlooks the fact that social historians, after having been almost exclusively con-
cerned with the working classes, in the last two decades have shifted the centre of
their interest to the middle classes. Although full members of middle classes, bankers
cannot readily be placed alongside industrialists or even other professional groups.
Studies have shown, for example, that in all industrialising countries during the
nineteenth century private bankers constituted the richest business group - in
Germany dominated by the Ruhr as much as in Britain dominated by the City of
London.59 Bankers were also the first business group to rise to prominence and to
establish close links with the landed aristocracy.60 These characteristics have led
some authors to consider nineteenth-century private bankers as an 'aristocratic
bourgeoisie'.61 Over the course of the twentieth century, however, the distinction
between bankers and other business groups has become less relevant as the banking
and financial worlds have become dominated by the senior executives of the large
joint stock banks.
The prominent role of religious minorities in banking has understandably aroused
much interest, with the causal relationship between minority status and business
58
 Genera l ly see B . E i c h e n g r e e n , Golden Fetters: TTre Gold Standard and the Great Depression, lgig-igjg
(New York, 1992): while solely in the case of Britain continuing work is represented by R. W. D.
Boyce, British Capitalism at the Crossroads igig—igj2: A Study in Politics, Economics, and International
Relations (Cambridge, 1987), and P. Williamson, National Crisis and National Government: British
Politics, the Economy and the Empire, ig26-ig^2 (Cambridge, 1992). More generally, see H.James,
'Financial flows across frontiers during the interwar depression', Economic History Review, 45 (1992)
and Contemporary European History, 1.3 (1992), which consists of contributions considering central
banking during the interwar period.
59
 W. D. Rubinstein, Men of Property (1981); D. L. Augustine-Perez, 'Very wealthy business men in
Imperial Germany', Journal of Social History, 22 (1988/9).
60
 Y. Cassis, 'Bankers in English society in the late nineteenth century', Economic History Review, 2nd
ser., 38 (1985).
61
 J. Harris and P. Thane, 'British and European bankers 1880-1914: an "aristocratic bourgeoisie"?',
in P. Thane, G. Grossick and R. Floud (eds), The Power of the Past: Essays for Eric Hobsbawm
(Cambridge, 1984).
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success having been discussed almost endlessly.62 The tight network of relationships,
both at a national level — for example, the Quakers in Britain — and at an inter-
national level — the Protestant bank in eighteenth-century France, or Jewish bank-
ing families in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Britain and America, most of
German origin — has been a favoured area of investigation.63
The importance of financial history for social historians is not limited to the upper
stratum of the banking world, to which the religious minorities undoubtedly be-
longed. The world of bank clerks has hardly been studied by historians,64 and this
neglect also includes the entire modern and contemporary world of employees in
general, together with those specifically classified as white-collar workers. There is
here a potentially very rich field, where financial history should naturally meet
women's history, given the increasing proportion of female labour employed in
banking and insurance since the First World War and even more so after 1945.
Financial history is also relevant to other aspects of the social history of the working
classes, as with regard to their savings and borrowings, which were initially catered
for by various types of popular and savings banks as well as by local wealthy
individuals.65
VI
The theme of finance and politics has long been associated, both on the left and the
right, with the notion of money power, of collusion between politicians and
financiers, if not of manipulation of the former by the latter. The myth of the '200
families' in France is one of the best illustrations of a popular belief to be found in
all countries. Here again, research undertaken in the last few decades has shown
that these were mainly unfounded notions.66 Although it would be naive to believe
that bankers and financiers cannot exert political influence, which in some cases
could be very strong, the autonomy of the state has by now been fairly well
established. The question has also been raised, particularly in Britain, of whether
bankers were capable of exerting a stronger political influence than other business
6 2
 N. T. Gross, 'Entrepreneurship of religious and ethnic minorities', in W. Mosse and H. Pohl (eds),
Judische Untemehmerin Deutschland im tg. und 20. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart , 1992).
6 3
 See, for example , H . Lii thy, La Banaue protestante en France, 2 vols (Paris, 1959, 1961); B . Supple , 'A
business elite: G e r m a n - J e w i s h financiers in n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y N e w York ' , Business History Review,
21 (1957); and P . W . M a t t h e w s and A. W . T u k e , History of Barclays Bank Limited (1926). L. H a n n a h
is currently preparing a further history of Barclays and is once more paying attention to its
Quaker origins.
6 4
 B u t see G. A n d e r s o n , Victorian Clerks (Manches ter , 1976); E . G r e e n , Debtors to their Profession: A
History of the Institute of Bankers i87g-ig7g (1979); and H . M . B o o t , 'Salaries and career earnings in
t h e B a n k o f Scot land 1 7 3 0 - 1 8 8 0 ' , Economic History Review, 44 (1991).
6 5
 See, for example , P . J o h n s o n , Saving and Spending: The Working Class Economy in Britain 1870-igjg
(Oxford, 1985).
6 6
 SeeJ. N. Jeanneney, 'Les "dynasties bourgeoises" de Beau de Lomenie', inj . N. Jeanneney (ed.),
L'Argent cache (Paris, 1984); and R. Sedillot, Les Deux Cents families (Paris, 15
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groups, in particular industrialists. Has British industry been sacrificed to the inter-
ests of finance? This remains a controversial issue in the historiography, as can be
seen, for example, by the divergent analyses of the return to gold in 1925.67
Public finance is another important field at the crossroads between financial
history and political history. This theme has been a privileged area of research for
the financial historians of the ancien regime, particularly in France, when 'finance' in
fact meant state finances — budget, tax collection — as opposed to private finance —
banks, investment etc. This reflects the fact that the public and private spheres were,
to a great degree, intermingled.68 Their increasing separation from the nineteenth
century on has meant that public finance has become an object of study in its own
right, although it has not aroused the same degree of interest as private finance.
Taxation, for example, remains a comparatively neglected area of research, together
with budgetary policy, which includes the study of the institutional framework of
policy-making, that is of the various ministries of finance and their senior officials.69
State regulation and state intervention have become a prime area of interest in
the review of the relationships between finance and politics. Direct intervention
was comparatively rare before the Second World War, generally only occurring in
times of crisis. Then, however, it could be very forceful, as in Germany in 1931,
when the state took control of the three big banks, holding 91 per cent of the
capital of the Dresdner Bank, 70 per cent of the Commerzbank and 3 5 per cent of
the Deutsche Bank coupled with managerial changes.70 The banks, however,
returned to private hands during the Nazi period. The state could also decide to
take control of the main financial institutions by nationalising them. Among
Western European countries, France went furthest in that direction with the
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nationalisation of the deposit banks — although not the banques d'affaires — and
insurance companies in 1946.71 But the state has other forms of intervention at its
disposal. The English joint stock banks, for example, were not nationalised after the
Second World War, but the state came to control their activities through the Bank
of England, for example, by fixing their cash ratios, the amount of their reserves or
even by giving them precise directives for lending.
The regulation of banking activities by the state has become widespread since the
crisis of the early 1930s, with banking laws passed in Germany in 1931 and 1934,
the United States in 1933, Sweden and Switzerland in 1934, Belgium in 1935 and
France in 1941, with the object of increasing state supervision and protecting
depositors. The effects of regulation, of course, greatly varied from country to
country. In Germany, for example, the separation between deposit and investment
banking, on the model of the American Glass-Steagall Act, remained an unfulfilled
objective, whereas it was implemented in Belgium, a country where universal
banking was pioneered some two decades before its corporate emergence within
the German states.72 The effects of regulations are decisive on the banking activities
of a country, and it is in this particular respect, rather than on matters of grand
political designs, that banking lobbying is at its strongest. This is particularly visible
in the competition for prominence between international financial centres,73 where
the degree of regulation can play a major role in attracting or deterring business.
VII
This editorial has neither sought to establish an agenda for the journal nor to define
in close, exact terms the nature of financial history. Rather, it has had the very
simple intent of trying to display the catholic scope of our interest. Even so, the
demonstration here has been limited by both space available and the particular
interests of the authors. Restrictions arising from linguistic capabilities have
meant that the growing body of literature concerned with Japanese financial devel-
opment has not been addressed.74 Omissions have necessarily arisen, to our regret,
especially with respect to the United States; and the lack of a mention, or of a
reference, should not be taken to have some deeper significance. The present
purpose has not been to give voice to some particular sectarian view, but to try and
indicate that this journal represents a broad church, within both financial history
and history.
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